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NOTES
it be specified thereon to the contrary, "when any such check is pre-
sented by or through any Federal Reserve Bank, Post Office, or
Express Co., or any respective agent thereof."' 9  This statute does
not relieve a drawee bank from liability merely upon its giving ex-
change but leaves it still liable under such circumstances until its
exchange draft is paid.20 Its effect is, if not to modify the common
law rule that an agent for collection can accept only cash in payment
of the debt owing his principle, certainly to limit the operation of
that rule in North Carolina to the extent of the option granted. And
it has been held under this statute that it is not negligence for a
Federal Reserve Bank to accept exchange instead of cash.21 That
decision is reasonable because under the statute the drawer who does
not specify on the check to the contrary immediately agrees that it
shall be payable in exchange. And because of this implied assent of
the drawer to payment in exchange such payment has been held not
to discharge him, but leaves him still liable if the exchange draft is
dishonored. 22
J. B. FORDHAM.
THE TIME FOR TAKING EXCEPTION TO THE COURT'S CHARGE
Bills of exception were founded on the statute of Westminster
2d (13 Edw. 1) Ch. 31. That statute does not expressly mention at
what time the exception is to be tendered, but the reason of the
thing, the practice of the common law courts, and the precedents
and authorities on the subject, prove that it must be at the time.of
the trial.' When an exception is taken to the charge of the court, it
must be tendered 'before a verdict is rendered 'by the jury in open
court. Otherwise the exception is not available. This was the gen-
Graham v. Warehouse, 189 N. C. 533, 127 S. E. 540 (1925).
' This statute was called forth by the recent struggle between the Federal
Reserve Banks and the small non-par banks in which the former tried to
force par clearance upon the latter by presenting checks over the counter for
payment in cash. The North Carolina Legislature came to the rescue of the
small North Carolina banks involved and enacted the statute in question. The
North Carolina court held the statute unconstitutional in Farmers, etc. Bank v.
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 183 N. C. 546, 112 S. E. 252 (1922), but
its decision was overruled by the Supreme Court of the United States on
appeal. 262 U. S. 649, 43 Sup. Ct. 651 (1922). For a further discussion of the
subject see C. T. Murchison, "Par Clearance of Checks," 1 N. C. L. Rev. 133
and a note 'by the same -writer in 2 N. C. L. Rev. 36. See also 37 Harv. L.
Rev. 133.
' Cleve v. Chemical Co., supra, note 6.
2Ibid.
'Morris v. Buckley, 8 S. & R. 211 (Pa., 1822).
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erally stated common law rule.2 Today the law in regard to excep-
tions is governed in the different states by statute.
The North Carolina Code8 provides that if there is error, either
in the refusal of the judge to grant a prayer for instructions, or in
granting a prayer, or in his instructions generally, the same is
deemed excepted to without the filing of any formal objections at the
trial. Exceptions of this type are taken in time when set out in the
appelant's statement of the case on appeal. 4 But exceptions for
omissions to charge in a particular way are different. If a party
thinks he is entitled to an instruction he should ask for it, and having
failed to do so, he cannot after the verdict complain, provided the
instruction given was correct.5 However if the omission is of such
vital importance that the charge given does not cover the entire case,
as required by statute,6 objections may be taken in the case on ap-
peal. 7 If there is a mistake in the judge's statement of the conten-
tions of the parties, however, objections must 'be made at the time.
If made after the verdict they are too late and deemed to have been
waived.8 There is a reason for the difference, as to time, between
the exceptions to the mistakes in the statement of the contentions
and the exceptions to errors of law. The North Carolina statutes
require the judge to charge the jury in regard to the law of the
case.9 Hence the charge to the jury is a fundamental part of the
trial. The statement of the contentions of the parties is not required
of the trial judge,10 although he is required to state the evidence in
the case to the jury." Therefore error in the statement of the con-
tentions is not a fundamental error and should be objected to at the
time.
'Gehl v. Milwaukee Produce Co., 93 N. W. 26 (Wis.. 1903).
3 C. S. 590, sub. 2; N. C. Code, sec. 412, subd. 3.
'Smith v. Smith, 108 N. C. 365, 13 S. E. 113 (1891) ; Posey v. Patton, 109
N. C. 455, 14 S. E. 654 (1891) ; Williams & Co. v. Haines, 137 N. C. 460, 49
S. E. 954 (1905) ; Schaeffer & Son v. Stone Co., 174 N. C. 781, 93 S. E. 931
(1917); Paul v. Benton, 180 N. C. 45, 108 S. E. 380 (1920).
'Shnimons v. Davenport, 140 N. C. 407, 53 S. E. 225 (1906); Sanders v.
Gilbert, 156 N. C. 463, 72 S. E. 610 (1911) ; State v. Groves, 119 N. C. 822, 25
S. E. 819 (1896) ; State v. Harris, 120 N. C. 577, 26 S. E. 774 (1897).
'C. S. 564. Patterson v. North Carolina Lumber Co., 145 N. C. 42, 58
S. E. 437 (1907) ; Hauser v. Furniture Co., 174 N. C. 463, 93 S. E. 961 (1917).
'Bowen v. Schnibben, 184 N. C. 248, 114 S. E. 170 (1922).
'State v. Johnson, 193 N. C. 701, 138 S. E. 19 (1927) ; Proctor v. Fertilizer
Co., 189 N. C. 243, 126 S. E. 608 (1925) ; Phifer v. Commissioners of Cabarrus
County, 157 N. C. 150, 72 S. E. 852 (1911).
'C. S. 564.
"'State v. Whaley, 191 N. C. 387, 132 S. E. 6 (1926).
- C. S. 564.
NOTES
In many other states the rule is different. In Massachusetts,
exceptions to the judge's charge must be taken before the jury re-
tires.1 2 The Virginia rule is similar to the Massachusetts view.13
The Texas statutes 14 provide that before the arguments and often
the evidence has been concluded, the judge shall put his charge in
writing and submit it to the parties. A reasonable time is given them
in which to examine the charge and present objections thereto, which
objections must be presented to the court before the charge is read to
the jury. All objections not so made and presented are considered
as waived.15 The rules of the Federal Courts require exceptions to
the instructions to be taken at the time and before the jury retires. 16
These conflicting rules of practice present the question whether it
is more advantageous to require exceptions to the charge to be made
before the verdict or to allow them to be made for the first time in
the case on appeal. Is the North Carolina rule the best solution of
this problem and best suited to the administration of justice?
It is argued that if exceptions be taken at the time, the judge will
be given the opportunity to change his charge'and correct the error.
But is the court likely to change his charge at the request or objec-
tion of one of the parties? This may be true as to inadvertent state-
ments in the charge; but, where the judge has spent much thought
on 'his instructions, undoubtedly he will prefer his opinion concerning
the law rather than the opinion of one of the parties. Consequently.
if this is the purpose of the statutes requiring exceptions to be made
at the time, this purpose would be accomplished only in a limited
number of cases.
Then it is contended that justice is best subserved by requiring
exceptions to be taken when the charge is given and that if the lawyer
does not know of the error at the time, it is his misfortune. Quite
Garfield & Proctor Coal Co. v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 248 Mass.502, 143 N. E. 312 (1924) ; Spooner v. Handley, 151 Mass. 313, 23 N. E. 840
(1890) ; Lee v. Gibbs, 10 Allen 248 (Mass., 1865).
" Arminius Chemical Co. v. Landrum, 113 Va. 7, 73 S. E. 459 (1912);
Collins v. George, 102 Va. 509, 46 S. E. 684 (1904) ; Clarke v. Sheet's Admn.,
99 Va. 381, 38 S. E. 183 (1901).
"Revised Civil Statutes of Texas, Art. 1954, 1970-1971.
'Eldridge v. Citizens Ry. Co., 169 S. W. 375 (Tex., 1914); Missouri K.
& T. Ry. Co. of Texas v. Smith, 172 S. W. 750 (Tex., 1915); Consolidated
Kansas City Smelting & R. Co. v. Schulte, 176 S. W. 94 (Tex., 1915); Mc-
Lauhlin v. Terrell Bros., 179 S. W. 932 (Tex., 1915).
'.Northern Central Cool Co. v. Milburn, 205 Fed. 270 (C. C. A., 8th, 1913)Wells Fargo Co. v. Zintiner, 186 Fed. 130 (C. C. A., 8th, 1911) ; St. Louis, L. M.
& S. -Ry. Co. v. Spencer, 71 Fed. 93 (C. C. A., 8th, 1895) ; Bracken v. Union
Pac. Ry. Co., 56 Fed. 447 (C. C. A., 8th, 1893).
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the contrary appear to be the dictates of justice. Is an entirely
erroneous result to be allowed to stand because at the particular
moment the lawyer does not know that it is error? This seems to
burden justice with technicalities. Opportunity should be given the
lawyer to review the charge and if there is error then he should be
allowed to show it.
It may be urged that there should be no distinction between excep-
tions to evidence and exceptions to the charge. It is the general rule
that exceptions to the evidence must be taken immediately, or the
objection is deemed waived. 17 Why should not this rule apply equally
to exceptions to the charge? There is a reason for this distinction.
This reason is the difference between the testimony and the charge.
Testimony is of various qualities. It may make an impression upon
the jury or it may not; it may be believed by the jury or it may not.
The jury regards the court's charge as the law of the case and their
verdicts are so influenced. An error in the admission or rejection of
testimony may not change the result, whereas an error in the charge
is a fundamental error. Hence it is right that exceptions to the
charge should not be governed by the strict requirements which gov-
ern the exceptions to the testimony.
The taking of exceptions when the charge is given tends to inter-
rupt the procedure of the court and cause confusion. Often very
lengthy exceptions are taken to the charge. If these would have to
be argued and reviewed by the trial judge considerable time would be
taken up, thus greatly delaying the transactions of business of the
court not only in that case but in others to follow.
By following the North Carolina rules of practice, therefore,
justice is more nearly attained, and this after all is the fundamental
purpose of all rules of practice.
W. A. DEVIN, JR.
Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Ives, 144 U. S. 408 (1892); Lee v. Methodist
Episcopal Church, 193 Mass. 47; 78 N. E. 646 (1906) ; Stewart a. Ferguson,
164 N. Y. 553, 58 N. E. 662 (1900); Sykes v. Everett, 167 N. C. 600; 83 S. E.
585 (1914).
